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AS IF IT HAD NEVER HAPPENED
ARTHUR RIPSTEIN*
[The logical positivists ofi [t]he Vienna Circle made certain
apparently very damaging criticisms of the kind of philosophy
that was current in their day.... We ... share with the critics a
basis of discussion such as neither of us shares with those who
have chosen to ignore these important developments and to
carry on in their old ways as if nothing had happened.
R.M. Hare'
[T]he injured right lives on in a claim for damages.2
Law students are usually told that the purpose of damages is to
make it as if a wrong had never happened.3 Although torts profes-
sors are good at explaining this idea to their students, it is the
source of much academic perplexity. Money cannot really make
serious losses go away, and it seems a cruel joke to say that money
can make an injured person "whole." Worse still, if money could
make an injured person whole, injuring someone and then paying
them seems just as good as not injuring them at all.
* Professor of Law and Philosophy, University of Toronto Faculty of Law. I am grateful
to Peter Benson, Peter Cane, Bruce Chapman, Jules Coleman, Dennis Klimchuk, Ernest
Weinrib, Karen Weisman, and Benjamin Zipursky for many years of discussion of these
issues, to Andrew Botterell and Martin Hevia for more recent ones, and to the participants
in the William and Mary Symposium on Law and Morality for their comments.
1. Hare continues, "[W]e therefore find it hard to discuss philosophy with, or to read the
books of, people who do not seem to be worried about the problem of convincing the sceptic
that their philosophical propositions mean something." R.M. Hare, A School for Philosophers,
2 RATIO 107, 117 (1960), reprinted in R.M. HARE, ESSAYS ON PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD 38, 49
(1972) [hereinafter HARE, METHOD).
2. WALTER VAN GERVEN ET AL., COMMON LAW OF EUROPE CASEBOOKS: TORT LAW 753
(2000).
3. See, e.g., FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., 2 THE LAW OF TORTS 1301 (1956)
("If defendant is a wrong doer and he is to pay damages to an innocent plaintiff, it seems
eminently fair that these damages should (at least) put the plaintiff as nearly as may be in
the same position he would have been in if defendant's wrong had not injured him.").
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My aim in this Essay is to redeem the common sense idea that
damages really do make it as if a wrong had never happened. I do
so by focusing on the normative structure of private rights to person
and property. I first show how such rights are best understood in
terms of an entitlement to have certain means subject to your
choice. I then go on to argue that although wrongdoing can cause a
factual loss, it does not change what a person has a right to. I will
then show how money can be understood as restoring to the
wronged party the means he or she is entitled to. I will close with
some broader reflections about the relation between law and
morality.
I. THE TRADITIONAL CONCEPTION OF PRIVATE LAW AND THE
"MODERN" OBJECTIONS
There is a familiar way of thinking about the law of private
remedies, both loss-based and gain-based, according to which the
purpose of a remedy between two private parties is to make it as
though the wrong in question had never occurred.4 So, for example,
in the most familiar case of compensatory damages, defendant is
made to repair plaintiffs loss, so that plaintiff will be in the
situation in which she would have been, if defendant had not
wronged her.5 In the equally important, if less familiar, context of
gain-based damages, the defendant is made to surrender the
benefits she gained through wronging the plaintiff. Thus defendant
is put back into the position in which she would have been, if she
had not wronged plaintiff.6 Law students accept something like this
picture in the first week of their torts course, as do experienced
lawyers trying to settle a case, asking what it would take to make
a problem "go away." My aim is to defend this familiar wisdom.
The supposed difficulties are almost as familiar as the view itself:
First of all, a sum of money, even a huge sum of money, does not
really make it as though someone has not suffered terrible bodily
injury, or lost a loved family member. Personal injuries are not
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cases of property damage, if injurer is made to compensate victim,
it may be that, from the point of view of the victim, it is as though
things had never happened; but, it might be said, it is hardly so
from the point of view of the injurer, who is left worse off as a result.
So, the argument continues, we cannot undo the harm but can only
transfer it, and the cost of making the transfer exacerbates the
problem.
The conclusion usually drawn from this line of thought, at least
since Holmes's The Common Law, is that the "moral phraseology"
in which the law "abounds" cannot be taken at face value.7 The real
inquiry is not about making wrongs go away, indeed, not about
wrongs at all, but rather about when we should call upon the
"cumbrous and expensive machinery" of the state to transfer a loss
from one person to another.8 Sophisticated people take old-fashioned
talk about making a plaintiff "whole," or making it as though a
wrong had never happened, as a sort of smokescreen to disguise the
difficult questions of social policy that judges are forced to confront.'
Patrick Atiyah further laments the fact that compensatory damages
are a "lottery," and that their payment results in higher consumer
prices.10 Like the philosophers on whose behalf Hare speaks in the
opening quote, people such as Atiyah doubt these familiar claims
about damages mean anything.
This line of thought is not limited to damages. Guido Calabresi
describes "causation" as a "weasel word" behind which judges hide
their policy choices.1 Lord Denning asserts that
the truth is that all these three duty, remoteness and causa-
tion-are all devices by which the courts limit the range of
liability for negligence or nuisance.... [I]t is not every conse-
quence of a wrongful act which is the subject of compensation.
7. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 79 (Little, Brown & Co. 1951)
(1881).
8. Id. at 96.
9. See P.S. ATIYAH, THE DAMAGES LOTTERY 9-21 (1997). For a review of that book, see
Arthur Ripstein, Some Recent Obituaries of Tort Law, 48 U. TORONTO L.J. 561 (1998).
10. See ATIYAH, supra note 9, at 143.
11. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OFACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 6 n.8
(1970).
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The law has to draw a line somewhere.... [Ultimately ... it is a
question of policy which we, as judges, have to decide."
The common sense view is also said to run into difficulty in
circumstances in which the injured party ends up better off as a
result of the wrong against her. In cases of "waiver of tort," plaintiff
declines to make the claim in tort for the wrong she has suffered,
demanding instead that defendant disgorge the gains he garnered
by wronging her. As a matter of legal strategy, as well as self-
interest, a plaintiff will only waive her tort rights when the defen-
dant's gain exceeds her loss. In such cases, she ends up doing better
for having been wronged. How can two remedies that differ in their
magnitude-the feature that is of immediate interest to the
parties-each serve to make it as though the wrong in question had
never happened? If that is not enough of a puzzle, how can they do
so solely at the election of the plaintiff?
The solution to all of these problems can be found in other ideas
that are both as familiar and unpopular as the problems them-
selves: the legal distinction between harm and wrongdoing, and the
dependence of remedies on primary rights. It is a commonplace of
legal analysis that not all harms are legal wrongs, and not all legal
wrongs are harms. If I cut across your lawn without your consent,
I commit a trespass against you, but any harm that I do to you is
well below the de minimis range. I wrong you nonetheless, even if
it is not worth your while to do anything about it. Another common-
place of private law is that not all harms are wrongful. If you lure
customers away from my business, you harm me, but as a matter of
legal doctrine you do not wrong me. Again, if you damage property
that I depend on, but have no legal right to, you harm me without
wronging me. I have no legal grounds for complaint. It is equally a
commonplace that private law remedies follow rights: the plaintiff
in a tort action comes before a court claiming that defendant has
wronged her, and seeking a remedy to address that wrong. None of
the puzzles arise if these basic ideas stay in focus.'
3
12. Lamb v. London Borough of Camden, [1981] Q.B. 625 (A.C.).
13. The misunderstandings that arise once people move away from these familiar ideas
are not inconsequential, for they have come to carry weight outside of the Academy as well
as within it. For example, the Virginia tort reform statute sets a flat cap for medical
malpractice damages. See, e.g., Pulliam v. Coastal Emergency Serv., 509 S.E.2d 307, 310 (Va.
[Vol. 48:19571960
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If the common sense idea is to be redeemed as an interpretation
of the law of damages, exactly what has happened and how things
would stand if it had not happened need to be specified. That is
what I propose to do. I will argue that we can understand the idea
that damages give expression to underlying rights by focusing on
the idea of a wrong, and so on the idea that damages serve to make
it as though the wrong had never happened.
These conclusions may strike you as bizarre, callous, or both.
There are many important respects in which money damages can
never undo terrible things that have happened. Most significantly,
I do not mean to deny the tremendous human significance of
suffering or loss. My claim is that despite these important dissimi-
larities, the sole rationale for granting damages at all-for bringing
the coercive and cumbrous machinery of the state to bear on a
particular defendant to require him to compensate the plaintiff he
has injured-is the respect in which damages make it as if the
wrong had never happened. It also does not follow that the wrong
does not matter if it can be made good: the remedy serves to repair
the damage, not to license it. The point of repairing it, I shall argue,
is to restore to plaintiff the means to which he or she had a right.
The claim that damages serve to make it as if a wrong had never
happened is not a factual prediction about the effects of a payment
of damages, but rather a normative claim about the relation
between wrongdoing and repair. Private law enforces the rights that
private persons have against each other. Those are not rights
against harm, as such, but rather rights against injuries brought
about in certain specified ways. The rights in question cannot be
identified apart from a specification of the wrongs that would violate
them. Thus, they are not rights against harms in the sense in which
Mill's "harm principle" has become a mainstay of debates about the
1999) (upholding damages cap as consistent with the Virginia and U.S. Constitutions);
Etheridge v. Med. Ctr. Hosps., 376 S.E.2d 525 (Va. 1989); see also Gourley v. Neb. Methodist
Health Sys., Inc., 663 N.W.2d 43, 70 (Neb. 2003) (per curium) (upholding NEB. REV. STAT. §
44-2825(1) (Reissue 1998) of the Nebraska Hospital-Medical Liability Act, which in 2003
limited recoverable damages in medical malpractice actions to $1,250,000). If damages are a
tool for shaping conduct, or for granting satisfaction to angry victims, flat caps make sense.
If, however, they are the vindication of preexisting rights, and serve to make it as though the
violation of those rights had never happened, then the measure of damages must always be
the measure of that in which plaintiff had a right.
20071 1961
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criminal law. 14 Instead, they are rights that others forbear from
injuring interests in particular ways. In the same way, the repair of
a wrong is not simply a matter of the causal annulment of its factual
effects but of the repair of the rightful claims of the person who has
been wronged.
In order to make this point, I will offer an interpretation of the
distinction between wrongs and harms. That distinction provides
the starting point for my analysis, because it highlights the sense in
which the central focus of private law is on norms of conduct and the
wrongs that consist in violations of those norms, rather than on
harms or benefits, considered simply as such.' 5 I do not mean to
deny that many familiar torts are "harm-based" in the sense that
the wrong complained of injures plaintiff or damages plaintiffs
goods. In the familiar context of a negligence action, the measure of
damages is tied to the magnitude of plaintiffs loss. Indeed, I will
also explain how a focus on wrongs rather than on harms can
explain the significance that attaches to the harm plaintiff suffers,
even though the same harm would not merit legal attention if not
brought about wrongfully. Recent torts scholarship has seen a move
away from the sort of instrumental accounts favored by Holmes,
Denning, and Calabresi, in favour of a much more nuanced exami-
nation of the distinctive relation between plaintiff and defendant in
a tort action. In much of this recent noninstrumentalist scholarship,
however, the bifurcation between wrongs and remedies at the heart
of instrumentalist analysis has been preserved. My two copanellists
and sometime coauthors will serve as examples. Jules Coleman has
argued that tort law is a matter of corrective justice, charged with
14. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859), reprinted in 18 COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN
STUART MILL 223 (John M. Robson ed., 1977) ("ITihe only purpose for which power can be
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent
harm to others."). Joel Feinberg, in his monumental work on the moral limits of the criminal
law, explicitly defines harm as to "set back an interest." 1 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS
OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO OTHERS 34 (1984). Feinberg goes on to narrow his conception
when he writes that his aim is to analyze the idea of harm "without mentioning causally
contributory actions." Id. at 31. On this understanding, although interests may be complex,
it must be possible to identify them independently of what violates them. The deficiencies of
the harm principle in the context of the criminal law can be seen in Arthur Ripstein, Beyond
the Harm Principle, 34 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 215 (2006).
15. Economic analyses of law, which focus on the incentive effects of various legal rules,
deny the connection between rights and remedies. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell,
Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 1178 (2001).
1962 [Vol. 48:1957
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repairing a wrong as between two persons; but he also maintains
that the idea of a wrong is merely a placeholder, requiring some
independent analysis and defense." Coleman compares the
principle of corrective justice to the retributive principle in criminal
law, arguing that each principle of redress requires some independ-
ent account of primary norms of conduct, but is compatible with a
wide range of such accounts. 17 Benjamin Zipursky has argued that
the core of tort law is the specification of duties governing interac-
tions between private parties, but also that the remedial stage
awarding damages to plaintiff who has established that defendant
has wronged her must be understood as an independent social
practice designed to give "satisfaction" to the victims of wrong-
doing.'" Both of these approaches avoid the bifurcation characteris-
tic of instrumental approaches to private law, because both suppose
that plaintiff and defendant must be analyzed in relation to each
other. 9 Yet they each fall into a different and equally unacceptable
bifurcation by supposing that norms of conduct and duties of repair
can be analyzed independently of each other. The debate between
them as to what makes up the "core" of tort law turns out to be a
fruitless verbal dispute, into which others have been drawn. Peter
Cane insists that
16. See JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENSE OF A PRAGMATIST
APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY 32 (2001).
17. Coleman writes that
no one regards it as an objection to retributivism that it fails to provide a theory
or a list of the kinds of conduct that ought to be criminalized. Retributivism is
not a theory of criminality; it is a theory about what ought to be, or of what may
legitimately be done by the state in those cases where a criminal misdeed has
been committed. Of course retributivism thereby presupposes that there will be
some means of picking out the relevant class of misdeeds.... [O]r at least a list
of what the crimes are.
Id. at 32-33.
18. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND.
L. REV. 1, 82-86 (1998). In a more recent piece, Zipursky puts the point this way: "The courts
in tort law do not stand ready to facilitate the rectification of wrongdoing, or to restore a
normative equilibrium, as corrective justice theorists maintain. Instead, they empower
individuals to obtain an avenue of recourse against other private parties." Benjamin C.
Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695, 755 (2003) [hereinafter
Zipursky, Civil Recourse].
19. The classic criticism of the instrumentalist bifurcation between plaintiff and
defendant is ERNEST WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAw (1995).
2007] 1963
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[t]here is a world of difference between a litigation-focused
concept of correlativity of remedial rights and obligations, and
an account of private law ... cashed out in terms (for instance) of
a reasonable balance between the interests we all share in
freedom of action, on the one hand, and security of person and
property, on the other.2"
Contrary to Coleman, Zipursky, and Cane, there is no difference
whatsoever. In the account that I will offer, duties of conduct and
duties of repair are inseparable. Duties of conduct protect each
person's entitlement to such means as he or she happens to have
against interference by others; duties of repair require that
wrongdoers restore equivalent means to those that have been
wronged. The state only has standing to empower plaintiffs to
demand that it "correct" a certain set of wrongs, and the only thing
it can do about those wrongs is correct them. Anything else is an
arbitrary use of force, inconsistent with the freedom of the citizens.
II. ENTITLEMENT TO MEANS As BASIS FOR PRIVATE RIGHTS
In order to make good on my claim that we can understand the
law of damages in terms of the idea of obligations and wrongs, I
must explain how losses-and, in certain cases, gains-are signifi-
cant to measuring the violation of a right. A good deal of confusion
has surrounded this issue, almost all of it generated by the fact
that harms and losses have a magnitude, in a way that neither
"deontological"' obligations nor wrongs consisting in the violation
of those obligations do. The criminal law might punish theft below
$1000 less seriously than it punishes theft above $1000, but it is
artificial to say that there is somehow a different obligation to
respect property depending on whether it is worth more or less than
$1000. It is no less artificial to imagine that determining which
20. Peter Cane, The Anatomy of Private Law Theory: A 25th Anniversary Essay, 25
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 203, 212 (2005).
21. Strictly speaking, the wrongs at issue in private law are dikaeological, not
deontological, as they involve rights and their correlative relational duties, rather than duties
alone. See Peter Glassen, The Classes of Moral Terms, 11 METHODOS 223, 224-27, 238-44
(1959); Michael Thompson, What Is It To Wrong Someone?, A Puzzle About Justice, in REASON
AND VALUE: THEMES FROM THE MORAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOSEPH RAZ 333, 336 (R.J. Wallace et
al. eds., 2004).
1964 [Vol. 48:1957
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obligation has been breached depends on the magnitude of the
resulting injury. Fortunately, my analysis does not depend on
anything so unintuitive. The nature of a wrong does not depend on
its magnitude at all. The obligation is to avoid violating the rights
of another. Your entitlement to security of person and property
constrains the activities of others in exactly the same way, regard-
less of the actual magnitude of a particular injury. Although the
obligation makes no reference to a magnitude, a wrong in violation
of that obligation will always have a magnitude, and can only be
addressed by the transfer of powers of choice equivalent in magni-
tude.
The core idea is that tort law protects people in the means that
they already happen to have. One person wrongs another by either
depriving him of means that he has at his disposal, or using means
that belong to him in ways that he has not authorized.
The distinction between means and ends is a philosophical
commonplace, but like many such commonplaces it requires a
precise formulation. It is sometimes said that choice is a matter of
taking up a means in order to achieve whatever ends you have. And
although this formulation is not false, in a sense it is misleading.
For the philosophical tradition originating in Aristotle and running
through Kant to Rawls, means are not simply tools a person uses to
pursue an already determinate end, but rather are essential to
setting your own purposes at all. You can only decide to do
something-make it your end-if you take it to be in your power to
do so. You might be mistaken about whether it is in your power. It
is certainly possible to pursue something that, as a matter of fact,
you will never succeed in. Thomas Hobbes sought to square the
circle, believing himself to have everything he needed-a compass,
a straightedge, and one of the greatest minds of the seventeenth
century. He was wrong, but if he did not have a compass or straight-
edge, or if he thought that the problem was mathematically beyond
him, he could not have so much as tried to square the circle. It could
not have been one of his ends. Other choices that people make have
better prospects for success, but the same structure. You can make
it your purpose to pursue more ordinary ends, provided that you
take yourself to have the means with which to achieve them.
Otherwise all you can do is wish or hope for those results, but you
cannot make them your purpose. Wishing is always easier-and in
2007] 1965
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certain ways, more satisfying-than choosing, because your wishes
do not need to form a consistent set, let alone one that can be fully
achieved. As you choose, you need to figure out which of the many
things you wish for you will actually use the means that you have
to achieve, and so your choices must form what you take to be an
achievable set.
My central contention will be that the law of torts protects each
person's means against other persons, so that each person is secure
in the means that he or she has. The law of torts does this by
articulating each person's private rights, as against other private
persons, to the means that they happen to have. Your ability to wish
is in some sense already secure from the actions of others. With your
ability to choose, things are otherwise. If there are many separate
persons, each can only have his or her means securely, provided
that everyone is subject to reciprocal limits on the ways in which
they use what is theirs. You must use your means in a way that is
consistent with everyone else being able to use what is, in turn,
theirs. Achieving that consistency requires limits on the side effects
of one person's activities on the means that others have, and also
restrictions preventing people from using means that belong to
others. If such consistency is achieved, then everyone is secure in
their capacity to choose, because it is up to each person to decide
what purposes his or her means will be used for. As objects in the
natural world, the means that you have are subject to generation
and decay, so they may become more useful or stop being useful,
with the passage of time. Your rights in private law simply guaran-
tee their security against the actions of other persons, not against
the ravages of time.22
Having means is antecedent to any particular purpose you might
set for yourself. Your entitlement to the means that you have does
22. On this understanding, the law of torts is of no help to those who have limited means
at their disposal. The much-discussed absence of a tort duty to rescue is just a special case of
tort law's indifference to questions about the adequacy of any particular person's means to
any purpose whatsoever. From that perspective, need is no different from any other wish.
Other departments of a liberal state must see to need, but tort law's focus on the means each
person has prevents it from doing so. See Arthur Ripstein, The Division of Responsibility and
the Law of Tort, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1811, 1833-37 (2004) [hereinafter Ripstein, Division of
Responsibility]; Arthur Ripstein, Private Order and Private Justice: Kant and Rawls, 92 VA.
L. REV. 1391 (2006) [hereinafter Ripstein, Private Order]; Arthur Ripstein, Three Duties to
Rescue: Civil, Moral, and Criminal, 19 L. & PHIL. 751 (2000).
[Vol. 48:19571966
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not depend upon the particular purposes to which you might wish
to put them. You might have a field that you wish to leave fallow, or
a piece of jewelry that you leave in a locked cabinet in your base-
ment. The sense in which they are yours is that you are free to
determine for yourself what purposes you will use them for, and
others are not permitted to interfere with your freedom to do so,
either by destroying the means that you have or by using them for
purposes you have not authorized. The structure of your entitlement
stays the same even if, as it turns out, the particular means that
you have are pretty much useless for any purpose that anyone can
think of. Your means are valuable because of their relation to your
ability to set your own purposes, not only because of the particular
purposes to which you put them. Those particular purposes may be
relevant to your claim to have wrongfully suffered consequential
losses as a result of being deprived of your means-the income you
would have generated with them, for example. Your means,
however, are more than a capital asset or stream of future income.
If the person who deprives you of them could show that you would
not have used them, you are not entitled to lost income, but you are
entitled to have them back, so that their subsequent nonuse is once
again an instance of your purposiveness rather than that of your
injurer.
It is sometimes said that the law of torts protects persons and
property as a result of the particular values or priorities that a
society happens to have, so that it might instead protect other
things, or decline to protect property, or protect other interests
that people have.23 My own view is very different: the law of torts
protects persons and property because your bodily powers as a
person, and the property you hold, exhaust the set of means that
you have available to you with which to set and pursue your own
purposes. The only way to secure your capacity to choose is by
securing the means that are at your disposal, and those means are
exhausted by your person and property. I choose the word "secure"
here carefully, because many other normative regimes, legal and
otherwise, might improve your capacity to choose by giving you
additional means or depriving you of means you are likely to use in
23. Cf. 1 FEINBERG, supra note 14, at 35 ("Legal wrongs then will be invasions of interests
which violate priority rankings.").
2007] 1967
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
a way that will eventually subvert your own capacity to choose.
Economic redistribution normally enables choice, and laws prohibit-
ing the use of certain drugs are sometimes defended on the grounds
that they extend a person's global capacity to choose by limiting
specific, local choices. The law of torts takes what you have as given.
The law of torts takes the abilities that you have as its starting
point. In the first instance, you have your bodily powers, including
both your physical ability to do various things, like climb a tree or
lift a rock, and your mental abilities to make plans. You also have
whatever external means are at your disposal-if you have property,
whether in land or chattels, you can use it as you see fit, in order to
pursue whatever purposes you want to.
I do not mean to suggest that it is appropriate for anyone to think
of his or her own body merely as a tool, as a sort of tradable,
expendable piece of property that he or she has. My claim is only
that there is the most consistent and plausible way of thinking
about the law of damages that suggests that it takes exactly this
attitude towards bodily injury, because it supposes that other people
must take that very attitude towards your body. Recent "philosophi-
cal" writing about the law of torts has often taken personal injury
as the starting point for analysis, talking either about the natural
duty of persons to respect the bodily integrity of others,24 or,
alternatively, talking about the way in which bodily health and
integrity are fundamental to a person's ability to make his or her
own way in the world.25 So understood, the safety of others is a
pressing interest that takes priority over any competing interest:
personal injury is presented as an outrage that must be addressed.
Without meaning to deny either of these uplifting pieces of moral
analysis, I do want to deny their significance to understanding the
law of torts and thus the law of damages. Damages are not awarded
to compensate for the awful things that people do to each other, but
rather to make it as if the persons had the means that they would
have had if others had not wrongfully deprived them of them.
The legally significant way to secure each person-in the means he
or she has as against others is to limit the conduct of others. That
24. See Stephen R. Perry, On the Relationship Between Corrective and Distributive Justice,
in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 237, 239 (Jeremy Horder ed., 4th series 2000).
25. See Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48
STAN. L. REv. 311, 342 (1996).
1968 [Vol. 48:1957
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is why the law of torts is part of the broader law of obligations: it
sets limits on the ways in which people may interact with each
other. Its secondary mode of securing what each person has is
through the law of damages. The law renders those entitlements,
not in the sense of making it more likely that they will be secure
across time, but in the more direct sense of making them be
entitlements: you are entitled to the means that properly belong to
you, as against all others; that is, you, and you alone, are entitled to
fix the purposes for which they will be used. Protecting each in his
or her person and property creates a regime of equal private
freedom, in which each person's capacity to set his or her own
purposes is secure against the equally protected freedom of others
to pursue their own affairs. The "cumbrous and expensive machin-
ery of the state"26 serves as guarantor of this equal freedom provided
that it both articulates the appropriate standards of conduct and,
should those standards be violated, it makes it as if the wrong had
never happened.
Before turning to the law of damages, however, I must say
something, albeit too briefly, about the general structure of the
obligations in the law of torts.
III. PERSONAL RIGHTS, LOSSES, AND OTHER WRONGS
Most theoretical writing about the law of torts has focused on
negligence.27 In part, it is because the law of negligence makes up
such a large proportion of the business of courts. It is also a function
of its doctrinal complexity: standard negligence analysis has many
elements to it, and each of them raises interesting questions, both
conceptual and normative. Unfortunately, the law of negligence has
probably also drawn so much attention because it fits easily with
the emphasis of post-Holmesian legal scholarship on benefits and
burdens.2 8 In a negligence action, plaintiff is always complaining of
the harm he or she has suffered, and so, in analyzing negligence, the
temptation to analyze in terms of benefits and burdens is ever
present.29 For the same reason, when negligence is displaced from
26. See HOLMES, supra note 7, at 96.
27. See, e.g., CALABRESI, supra note 11.
28. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Sleight of Hand, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1999 (2007).
29. See id.
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center stage, the focus too often passes to strict liability torts that
look harm-based.3 °
Despite these merits of negligence as a central theme in tort
analysis, an exclusive focus on harm-based torts distracts attention
from the generic structural features of tort law considered more
generally. Torts include intentional wrongs as well as negligent
ones, but that is the wrong place to draw the contrast because it
makes it seem as though all torts must be harm-based, and differ
only in the state of mind that they require on the part of defendant.
Instead, the right way to understand the broader structure of tort
law is to focus on what it is to have something as your means. To
have something as your means is to have it subject to your choice-
that is, for you to be the one who decides how it will be used. This
entitlement is subject to two, and only two, types of violation.
Someone can interfere with your secure entitlement to your
means by depriving you of those means, or by using those means for
purposes that you have not authorized. The first of these is the basis
of all damage-based awards, from negligence, through nuisance, to
the various forms of product liability that have emerged in recent
decades. In each case, plaintiff comes before the court, complaining
that defendant has deprived him or her of something to which he or
she had a right. And, in each case, plaintiff demands to get back
what he or she was deprived of. The second type of interference does
not necessarily deprive plaintiff of anything, though it often does.
This second type of interference is the basis of the law of trespass
against land and chattels, and also, when applied to persons, of the
law of battery. In cases of both trespass and battery, one person
uses something belonging to another, whether property or that
person's body, for a purpose that has not been authorized by that
person. I use the word "use" here broadly, because the idea that
your means are subject to your choice carries with it the entitlement
to exclude all others from subjecting those means to their purposes,
even in the trivial sense of touching you without your permission.
Some torts, such as conversion, both deprive plaintiff of some-
thing and also use it for purposes plaintiff has not authorized. Many
30. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis,
111 HARv. L. REv. 869, 883 & n.3 (1998) (discussing strict liability with reference to benefits
and burdens).
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trespasses also damage the thing trespassed upon, as in Coase's
famous example of the wandering cattle." The overlap between
these wrongs, however, should not distract attention from their
differing analytical structure: there is a difference between being
deprived of means and having those means used in ways that you
did not authorize. That is why a battery, as an unauthorized
touching, is still wrongful even if it does no harm.
IV. RIGHTS SURVIVE WRONGS: NEGLIGENCE
If someone deprives you of your powers, they deprive you of part
of your ability to choose, in the sense of the ability, to use those
powers to set and pursue your own purposes. But they do not
deprive you of your entitlement to have those powers at your
disposal. This is particularly obvious in the case of theft. Suppose
you have a car, and I take it. Who does the car now belong to? There
is one sense in which someone might be prepared to say that it now
belongs to me, if I am in physical possession of it. But the law is not
interested in that question, but rather in the question of whom it
properly belongs to. The answer to that question is that it belongs
to you. My depriving you of it does not make it stop belonging to
you. That is why the law can compel me to give it back, and can
compel me to do so even if I took it as a result of a completely
innocent mistake. Now suppose that I deprive you of it in a different
way-rather than taking it, I damage or destroy it. If I damage it,
you are in the same position as you would be in if I destroyed it: you
would not have the car you are entitled to have. The law of damages
makes it as though my wrong against you had never happened, by
giving you back the thing you were entitled to have. If I destroy the
car, I cannot literally give it back. What I can do is give you back
equivalent means, that is, I can give you a sum of money equivalent
to the replacement cost of the car. Not only does that sum of money
put you in a position where you can go out and purchase the car if
you like, it also enables you to liquidate your interest in the car if
you so choose. The law of damages views any assets you have as
something that can be used for pursuing your purposes, both
directly, by using them to accomplish particular purposes, as when
31. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2-3 (1960).
20071 1971
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
you use your car to drive to visit friends; or indirectly, as when you
sell your car in order to buy new appliances for your kitchen. When
'you had the car in the first place, you could have sold it, and used
the proceeds for other purposes; by compelling me to give you that
amount of money, the law compels me to put you back in the
position you would have been in-you can either acquire another
car, or do something else. Your ability to pursue your purposes is
the same as it always was. It is as if it had never happened.
I will go through each of the parts of this analysis in more detail:
what it is to have means at your disposal; what it is to be deprived
of those means; how a right to them survives the deprivation; and
how money reverses the deprivation, thereby restoring the right
that you had. I will begin with negligence, but then move on to
consider trespass. I will assume the role of wrongdoer, and you the
role of plaintiff. As I work through the analysis, I will take it that
you have established all of the traditional elements of negligence
analysis, and the only remaining question concerns damages.
At no point in the analysis will I focus on what happens to my
holdings in the process of making it as though you had never been
wronged. There is a natural misunderstanding that leads people to
suppose that where there is a net loss that must either lie where it
falls or be shifted to some other person, the only issue is where to
place it. On the account I will defend, the "allocation" of a "burden"
is the conclusion of the analysis, not the problem the analysis is
supposed to solve. Just as an ordinary negligence action is struc-
tured by the question of whether the defendant owed plaintiff the
duty to avoid injuring her in that way, whether defendant breached
that duty, and whether the injury she suffered fell within the ambit
of defendant's duty, so the analysis of whether defendant must pay
for plaintiffs loss depends upon the same set of questions: did
defendant wrongfully deprive plaintiff of something to which she
had a right? The law of damages requires a remedial transaction so
that the net effect of the involuntary transaction and the compelled
transaction is to make it as though plaintiff had never been
wronged. Defendant will often end up with a loss, because the effect
of the remedy is to make it as though defendant had never wronged
plaintiff but has used up some of the powers at his disposal.32
32. This problem is particularly pressing if we suppose that the sort of "corrective" or
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A. Having Means at Your Disposal
Using the word "means" here, I intend to make explicit the idea
contained in such colloquialisms as "a person of means" or "living
beyond your means," that is, the idea that the means you have are
relevant to your ability to achieve whatever you happen to want to
achieve. A person of means has lots of money, because, although
money cannot buy everything, it can buy many things. The person
who lives beyond his means is trying to achieve things that he
cannot afford to achieve. Among the means a person has, first and
foremost, of course, are that person's mental and physical powers,
because they are the things that are used to pursue whatever
purposes he or she has. But, equally obviously, one can have other
things as means, including, prominently, property.
Talk about each person having his or her own body merely as "a
means" may strike many as misleading, offensive, or both. So too
may parallels between personal injury and property damage.
Advocates of economic analysis of law have been happy to regard all
injuries as fungible, and this is the aspect of economic analysis that
seems most at odds with ordinary understandings. The difficulty
with economic analysis is not the equivalence itself but rather that
it has presumed such an equivalence without offering any explana-
tion of it, because economic analysis generally supposes that tort
liability serves to deter future offenders, so that any role it has in
undoing the effects of a wrong is merely incidental.
If you have certain means, you have them in a way that is, to
borrow a phrase from the philosopher John Rawls, "all-purpose."
33
Your means are at your disposal. Although the only way you can use
them is by using them for some particular purpose, they are, as a
general matter, useful, because they can be used for a variety of
rectificatory justice involved in these cases is a matter of restoring some prior distribution,
a distribution which was thought to be just on its own merits. On such an understanding, the
prior distribution has not been restored, so they have been rectified for some, at the expense
of others, and, if this expense is borne by the wrongdoer, that may be appropriate, but how
is it returning things to a status quo? Indeed, it does not even seem to be returning the
relation between the parties to the situation in which it would have been without the wrong.
For further general discussion regarding the relation between private law and distributive
justice, see Ripstein, Division of Responsibility, supra note 22, and Ripstein, Private Order,
supra note 22.
33. JOHN RAWis, PouITcAL LIBERALISM 187 (Columbia Univ. Press 1996) (1921).
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purposes. This will be important to what follows, because it is the
key to understanding consequential damages. If you have something
as your means, you thereby also have whatever further means
follow from having them. So, if you have something that can be used
as a way of generating more useful things-property on which you
can earn income, for example-then you have that income as your
means also. You do not have them with the same certainty that you
have the property itself, however, which is why future income is
discounted in the familiar way that it is.
B. Being Deprived of Your Means
Which means are yours depends upon your legal relations to
other persons. Your means are the ones that you can use without
seeking permission from others, and others may not use without
your permission.
If I damage or destroy means that you have, I interfere with your
ability to decide what to do because I deprive you of the wherewithal
to do those things. But not everything I do that narrows your range
of choices does so by depriving you of means you had a right to. I
might buy the last lettuce at the supermarket, effectively preventing
you from making a salad. My act prevents you from acquiring
something that you could have used to do something, but it does not
deprive you of any powers you had. It just stops you from using the
powers you have-in this case, money-to acquire new ones. If I
pick the last wild lettuce in a wilderness area, I do not deprive you
of means either. Here too, I simply eliminate an opportunity for you
to use your powers-in this case, your hands-to acquire something
useful. Although I could have produced the very same effect by
pushing you out of my way, I produced it without interfering with
your possession of your means. You can still use your money or
hands to do other things. All I have done is change the world in
which you can now decide what to do.
This distinction between what you already have and what you are
trying to get by using what you already have is familiar from the
doctrine of first acquisition in the law of property. In the famous fox
capture case of Pierson v. Post, 4 a disputed fox went to the "saucy
34. 3 Cai. 175, 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
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intruder" who captured it, 5 not the plaintiff who had tired it out by
giving chase.36 The reason is simple: plaintiff had not yet acquired
the fox; he had only used his powers-in this case, his legs, horses,
and hounds-to try to capture it.37 He had no right against defen-
dant that he succeed in his efforts, any more than you have a right
against other shoppers that a lettuce be in place when you arrive in
the produce aisle. The saucy intruder may turn out to be better off
as a result of the plaintiffs efforts, in a way that you make it no
easier for me to acquire the lettuce. This difference is merely
incidental to the issue of wrongdoing, because the problem in both
cases is that nobody has a right that others provide an environment
suited to the uses to which she hopes to put her means.
The same structure animates the celebrated Fontainebleau case, 38
in which plaintiff was refused an injunction to prevent defendant
from erecting a tower that would cast a shadow that made plain-
tiff's pool and cabana unattractive to tourists.39 The court held that
plaintiff had no right to passage of light, not because the light was
of no value to the plaintiff-it was of great value-but because
plaintiff was not entitled to require defendant to use his land to
accommodate plaintiffs preferred use of his.40 The court took it for
granted that defendant's property right was, in the first instance,
the right to occupy the airspace on and above his land.41 Some might
wish to question the wisdom of this as a matter of social policy, but
the court simply took the settled law of property as given. With the
idea that defendant has the right to occupy his own space, it follows
straightforwardly that plaintiff may not encumber part of that space
to create a path for light to flow through, because that would mean
that plaintiff was entitled to use part of defendant's space for a
purpose that defendant had not chosen. Thus the harm suffered by
plaintiff is irrelevant, as plaintiffs claim that he has a right to be
free of defendant's shadow is equivalent to the claim that defen-
dant's space must be used to suit plaintiffs specific purposes. This
35. Id. at 182.
36. Id. at 175.
37. Id.
38. Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-five Twenty-five, Inc., 114 So. 2d 357 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1959).
39. Id. at 358-61.
40. Id. at 359-60.
41. See id. at 359.
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claim is inconsistent with the idea that each is entitled to use his or
her means as he or she sees fit, but not entitled to use means
belonging to another. The same structure applies to the familiar
English case of Bradford v. Pickles, in which defendant diverted
percolating water from running under his land into plaintiffs
reservoir. 42 Although the reservoir owner relied on the water, he did
not have a right to have defendant arrange his affairs so as to
provide a suitable path for it. 43 Defendant's conduct was motivated
by the hope that plaintiff would be forced to purchase his interest in
the land, but the court held that this was of no consequence.44
Defendant is free to use his means-in this case, his land-as he
sees fit, provided only that he does not interfere with plaintiffs use
of his means as he sees fit. The only way to reconcile their separate
claims to use what is theirs for their own purposes is to relieve
defendant of any obligation to use what is his in a way that
accommodates plaintiffs preferred use of his own property.
In both Pierson v. Post and Fontainebleau, plaintiff was unable to
use his powers-his ability to give chase and his land, respec-
tively-in the way he chose-catching foxes and attracting guests.
In each case, the action of others changed the environment in which
he used his means, making it pointless to give chase or build a
luxury hotel, because the fox was unavailable and the tourists
uninterested. Yet neither plaintiff was deprived of means he had, or
even deprived of the ability to use them in the preferred way.
Defendant in Pierson v. Post did not break plaintiffs legs, and
defendant in Fontainebleau did not destroy plaintiffs pool or
cabana. The first remained free to chase other foxes, the second free
to try to attract guests. The right to use your means as you see fit is
the right to try to do various things, not the right to succeed or the
right to a favorable environment where you are more likely to
succeed at some particular purpose.45
This specification of what it is to have means provides a simple
account of why pure economic loss is generally not recoverable in
42. [1895] A.C. 587, 587 (H.L.).
43. Id. at 587.
44. Id.
45. The subsequent history of the plaintiff hotel in Fontainebleau makes this clear:
concerns about skin cancer subsequently made a shaded pool area attractive to guests. Which
environments are favorable for which purposes depends in part on the choices of others.
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tort, even when it is foreseeable. The standard explanation for this
exclusion is that permitting recovery for economic loss would open
up the floodgates of litigation, because the amount of economic loss
foreseeable in the case of a wrong is almost without limit. A focus on
a person's right to particular means, in the form of a property right,
puts a finger in the dyke of the floodgates argument. There is no
liability in negligence for pure economic loss because the plaintiff
has no proprietary right to the economic interest that was injured.
Put in the vocabulary of means, plaintiff was not deprived of means
to which he or she had a right against defendant. As a result,
although defendant may have behaved badly, and plaintiff may
have suffered, there is no wrong to make up. No damages are
awarded, because from the point of view of plaintiffs claim to those
means, nothing happened.
Not everything that a person benefits from, or uses to his
advantage, counts as his means in the relevant sense. The paradig-
matic examples of economic loss that is not recoverable involve
users of a bridge that is owned by somebody else. Defendant
destroys a bridge that plaintiffs customers use to get to and from
his place of business. Such examples illustrate the sense in which
someone can use something without it being at that person's
disposal. The drivers who cross the bridge are, in legal language,
"licensees" who are permitted to use the bridge in a particular way,
but not to use it however they see fit. They would not be entitled to
close the bridge down, to exclude others from it, to demolish it, or to
sell it and have it moved to another location.46 The owner of the
bridge, as a matter of private law, presumably has all of those
powers over it, even if legislation limits his exercise of them. Insofar
as a wide variety of public law r6gimes limit those private powers,
they do nothing to change the basic legal relationship between the
owner and the person who damages it, or between the owner and
those who are licensed to use the bridge.
Similarly, cases in which a wrong is suffered by an employee
do not normally give her employer a cause of action against the
injurer, even though the injurer causes the employer to suffer a
loss. Employment contracts give the employer rights against the
46. See Peter Benson, The Basis for Excluding Liability for Economic Loss in Tort Law,
in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 427, 434-35 (David Owen ed., 1995).
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employee, but no right to the employee as against third parties.
Any public law regulations of the employment relationship do not
change this basic structure. The relationship between employer
and employee is fundamentally different from the relation that
the owner of a domestic animal has to that animal. The owner can
complain of being wronged if the animal suffers injury. That is
because, as a matter of private law, the animal is entirely at the
owner's disposal, even if, as a matter of public law, there are
statutes governing health and cruelty to animals that limit the
owner's powers.47 It is the ability to dispose, not the vulnerability to
disadvantage, that is significant here. The key employee may be
much more significant to a corporation's ability to do business than
any piece of property. Because private law focuses on rights rather
than on the mere fact of disadvantage, the loss to the employer is
insufficient to generate a cause of action.48
The cases of economic loss and failure to provide a favorable
environment contrast with the cases in which someone does deprive
you of your means. In those cases, you are no longer able to pursue
purposes because your means are no longer available to you. The
hunter with broken legs cannot even chase foxes (with his legs); the
hotelier whose pool is full of toxic wastes cannot invite people to
swim.
C. Rights Survive Wrongs
If I deprive you of something to which you have a right, I wrong
you. The very idea that I could do that to you depends on the fact
47. Again, in Roman law, if one person injured the slave of another, the loss was
recoverable, on grounds that it was property damage. We can nicely encapsulate one aspect
of what is wrong with slavery by noting the differences between the way wrongs against
employees are treated and the way in which wrongs against slaves were treated. No employer
has another person at his disposal in this way.
48. Perhaps worth noting in this context is that economic analysis will always have
difficulty explaining the exclusion of economic loss, because it focuses only on harms and
benefits. As a result, the likely effects of this type of vulnerability must be the only measure.
Other factors may or may not be proxies for the basic distinction, notably Richard Posner's
claim that economic loss is not likely to involve the net loss of wealth in the economy, because
others are likely to simply take their business elsewhere in a functioning market economy.
See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 251-
52 (1987). If this is ever true, it is just as much true of economic loss that is consequential on
property damage, so it cannot be the real explanation of the exclusion.
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that by wronging you I do not extinguish your right. Just as the
person who steals or converts the property of another does not
acquire good title in the object because the original owner retains it,
so the person who damages or destroys means belonging to another
does not disturb the other's right to those means. The normative
situation is unchanged, because a person can only lose a right to
something through a voluntary act of abandonment or transfer, and
not always even that way. An involuntary transaction in which
someone else takes, damages, or destroys something that is yours
does not change your rights. It only changes your ability to exercise
them.
The idea that how things should be is not changed by any event
that should not have happened sounds puzzling, but it is actually
familiar from other contexts. Suppose you make a mistake adding
a column of figures; the correct sum is not changed by the fact that
you wrote down the wrong one. I copy a quotation down incorrectly,
and the correct quotation remains correct, no matter how many
further copies are made of my mistaken transcription. Someone
makes a common mistake in reasoning; whether the conclusion
follows from the premise is fixed by the rules of sound reasoning,
not by the way they were mistakenly applied. In each of these cases,
the things should not have happened, as identified by the rules of
addition, transcription, or reasoning, but these do not change the
result those rules require. If someone then corrects the mistake, it
does not undo the fact that the mistake really happened, but in a
perfectly serviceable sense we know exactly what the result was
supposed to be, and so we cannot go back and correct it. The
relevant norm takes priority over what factually happened.
Rules governing legal entitlements are less sharply defined than
rules governing addition or transcription. They are more like rules
for translating from one language to another. Despite the mass of
unclear or controversial issues of translation, many things are still
uncontroversial mistranslations. The mistake does not change the
correct answer-you still should have translated the Latin 'lege" as
"by law," not as 'law."
What happens as a matter of fact is irrelevant to legal require-
ments in another familiar context: the appellate court. A case can
only be appealed on questions of law, and the finding of law by the
court below, although it is the starting point for the appeal, counts
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for nothing if the competent court decides that the appellant was
entitled to a different legal rule. If the court below held that plaintiff
and defendant had a valid contract and ordered completion of it, the
appellate court can reverse that finding, because the conclusive
application of the legal rules, rather than what actually happened
-in this case of the decision of the court of first instance-
determines the rights of the parties. When the holding of a trial
court is overturned, from the point of view of the rights of the
parties it is as if it had never happened, from which it does not
follow that, in fact, it never happened. It is a datable event in the
history of the world, but one that does not shape the rights of
parties.
In a parallel way, if I break your vase, all you have are shards.
But you have a right to the intact vase. Only deeds to which you
are a party can change your private rights; a deed of which you
are simply the victim cannot. The deed is a datable event in the
history of the world, but one that is entirely without normative
significance.49 Kant makes this point in terms of what he calls
"intelligible possession."'5 He notes that rights to property involve
an entitlement to a thing that persists even when you are not
holding it, so that you can be wronged in relation to it without being
wronged in your own person.51 If I grab an apple out of your hand,
I perform a battery against you as I displace your fingers from it.
The wrong of theft or conversion is fundamentally different, because
I can wrong you with respect to an apple that you have put down, or
left at home, or as it sits on your tree, hundreds of miles away from
you. This idea of rightful possession explains the sense in which
your claim to a thing persists, even after another has taken it from
you or destroyed it. The apple is still yours as a matter of right if it
is physically separated from you; it continues to be yours as a
matter of right even if I am now holding it or if it no longer exists
because I have eaten it.
49. Public law operates differently: the state can place you under an obligation without
you being a party to it in any apparent sense. The social contract tradition has sought to
articulate a sense in which citizens are always parties to legitimate actions of their
governments, but the possibilities of that approach are not my concern here.
50. IMMANUEL KANT, METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (1797), reprinted in PRACTICAL
PHILOSOPHY 408 (Mary Gregor trans., 1996).
51. Id. at 404.
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There is perhaps something counterintuitive in the suggestion
that you could have a right to something that no longer exists. The
idea that your right survives the wrong against it underscores the
fact that the entitlement to damages does not depend on anything
other than the underlying right. The counterintuitive nature of the
formulation is merely verbal: If I owe you $100, due last Thursday,
but I failed to pay, my obligation does not disappear. I still owe
you the money, even if, as it turns out, I have not earned it yet, and
so it does not yet exist. In both cases, making me pay simply gives
effect to the underlying obligation that I breached. In neither
case is it a way of achieving something else, which, through some
remarkable coincidence, is most effectively achieved by my giving
you means equivalent to what you were already entitled to. Instead,
both the basis of your right to repair and its content derive from the
primary right I invaded. You are entitled to be made whole because
I have interfered with your right to your means; you are entitled to
equivalent means because the right I violated was to those very
means.
Your surviving right is the basis of your cause of action against
me in court: you have standing to sue me. The state does not
directly compel me to pay you, because the surviving right is yours:
it is up to you to decide whether to enforce it, so you must take me
to court to satisfy it. Like any other private right you might have,
you are entitled to stand on your rights but not compelled to. If I
owe you money but fail to pay, you can take me to court, but you do
not have to, and the state will not effect a transfer unless you assert
your right. If I ask to come into your home, you can let me in or
refuse. The state will only keep me out if you ask it to. If I mistak-
enly take your raincoat, you can go to court to compel me to give it
back, but the state will not act unless you do.
Thus the central facet of a tort action that Zipursky seeks to use
to distinguish civil recourse from corrective justice-the power
the private plaintiff has to come before a court to press her case
against defendant, as opposed to some public agency making either
the determination of wrongdoing or the correction of wrongs its
business 52-turns out to be a direct implication of the idea that tort
law protects each person's entitlement to have her means subject to
52. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 18, at 733-35.
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her exclusive choice. Her entitlement to determine when she will
stand up for her rights has the same basis as her claim to damages.
The idea that your right survives the wrong committed against it
does not entail that the remedy makes the wrong rightful, so that
the wrongdoer has a choice between refraining from wrongdoing or
wronging and paying you.53 Some defenders of economic analysis
have sought to explain familiar aspects of tort law in just this way,
as a pricing system, or, as Guido Calabresi once described it, a
private power of eminent domain.54 The paying of damages does not
serve to retroactively make the wrongdoing permissible, because the
wrong is a violation of the plaintiffs right. If defendant could decide
to violate plaintiffs right to person and property, plaintiff would
be subject to defendant's choice. The primacy of plaintiffs right
precludes that possibility. That right does not expire once he is
wronged, and so damages serve to restore the plaintiff to the
situation he was in, so that plaintiffs freedom, as measured by the
means at his disposal for doing as he sees fit, can be restored.
Having received means equivalent to what he lost, from the point of
view of the plaintiffs ability to set his own purposes, it is as if it had
never happened.
D. Give Them Back
If someone takes your means, the way to correct the imbalance
between what you are entitled to have and what you have-or what
you have and what you can use-is by giving them back. If the
means no longer exist, then in order to give you what is yours, you
need to receive equivalent means. I probably cannot put your vase
back together again, and even if I could, the most I could give you
is a repaired vase, not an intact one. Your right is to have the means
you had a right to all along.
In cases in which one person accidentally injures another, the
way to set things right is to focus on the injury. The injurer must
repair the injury; that is, to use the language introduced earlier, the
injurer must provide the injured party with means equivalent to
53. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin Zipursky, The Moral of Macpherson, 146 U. PA.
L. REV. 1733, 1810 (1998).
54. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1122 (1972).
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those that he lost through the injury. For example, if I injured you
and you are unable to work, I have deprived you both of the use of
your body during your period of recovery and also of the uses to
which you would have put your body during that period, and so of
any further means that you can show that you would have accrued
in the process. That is, I must make up your lost income. If I
damage your property, I must pay for both the cost of repairing or
replacing it and for its lost income. If you can show that there are
uses to which you would have put it for earning money, I have
deprived you of the further means that you would have acquired had
I not interfered with your property. As a result, the loss is shifted to
me.
In what sense, then, have things been put back where they were,
when all that we really seem to have done is, as Holmes put it, use
the "cumbrous and expensive machinery" of the state55 to shift a
burden from one person to another? A burden has not disappeared,
and things will never be the same. What's done is done.
Yet if we think about wrongdoing in terms of an interference with
the means plaintiff was entitled to have with which to set and
pursue his or her own purposes, rather than in terms of benefits and
burdens, the fact that a loss remains after damages have been paid
is of no significance. Although defendant ends up bearing the loss,
the claim that the damages restore the prior condition is not a claim
about damages restoring a prior distribution.
People bear losses all the time without the freedom of others
being implicated. If I had damaged my own property instead of
yours, I would be left bearing the loss. If I had injured myself rather
than injuring you, I would be left bearing the loss. In each of these
examples, from the standpoint of our respective rights to secure
possession of our means as against each other, nothing has taken
place because there has been no interference with any person's use
of a thing to which he has a right. Although thephysical loss does
not go away after either of these things occurs, the holdings people
have changes, but people continue to interact with their rightful
holdings. So, too, after a wrongful loss is shifted to the wrongdoer,
the holdings people have changes, but people continue to interact
with their rightful holdings. The situation can be redescribed as one
55. HOLMES, supra note 7, at 96.
20071 1983
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
in which people have the holdings they are entitled to. Through my
carelessness, I have used up some of my means, by injuring you and
needing to restore your means.
E. Money
Money is something that can only be used by being exchanged. It
is also a universal means, in that it can be exchanged for (almost)
any other means. As Kant puts it, money is the "universal means by
which men exchange their industriousness."56 Although few people
would be indifferent between being free of injury and being injured
and receiving compensation, adequate compensation can enable a
person to have (almost) the same range of options. The qualification
"almost" is important here. The claim is not that life can be just as
enjoyable or easy. Compensation does not aspire to place a person
on the same indifference curve she would have been on had she not
been injured. My sentimental attachment to my property, and my
experiential connection to my body are not things that can be
replaced, so they cannot be compensated.57 Courts frequently award
damages for pain and suffering, and critics of corrective justice are
right to wonder whether they do anything at all to make plaintiffs
"whole." They may make plaintiffs less unhappy, and that is not a
crazy thing for a court to try to do. But damages do not restore or
correct anything. Compensatory damages give you back the means
you had. Your happiness, considered as such, is not among the
means you use to set and pursue your purposes, even if, for
example, your mental health could be described as something you
use in that way. That is why someone who makes you unhappy
without injuring your person or property is not liable, even if you
are more successful at whatever you do when you are happy. 8
56. KANT, supra note 50, at 435.
57. See Bruce Chapman, Wrongdoing, Welfare and Damages: Corrective Justice and the
Right To Recover for Non-pecuniary Loss, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 409,
420 (D. Owen ed., 1995).
58. But if you require counseling to regain your focus as the result of a wrong, you recover
the cost of it because the wrong deprived you of your most important power, the ability to
decide how to use your other powers. I remember being told as a law student that the real
point of pain and suffering damages was to cover lawyer's fees. I have no idea whether they
correlate with fees, but the explanation is striking in its desperation to find something that
they accomplish, because they so plainly do not make tort victims whole.
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In the first instance, your entitlement to your person and
property does not depend on the particular purposes you pursue
with it. If I negligently destroy a box of philosophy books that sat in
your basement, you are entitled to their replacement cost even if
you had forgotten you had them and purchased new copies, lost
interest in the subject, or forgotten (or never knew) how to read the
languages they were written in.
Consequential damages are just a further application of the same
set of ideas. They are a further application, because your entitle-
ment to your person and property does not depend on your intention
or ability to use them in any particular way. Consequential damages
focus on how you would have used the means to which you have a
right. One of the things you can use your means to do is produce
more means. If I deprive you of means you could have used, I
thereby deprive you of the further means you could have generated.
The precise quantity you could have generated may be uncertain, so
that some discount factor may apply.59 But the core idea is the same:
I have deprived you of means to which you would have had a right.
If I wrongfully damage or destroy your car, a court can easily
determine what would make it as if the wrong had never happened:
a car of the same color, model, mileage, and condition. There is a
functioning market in used cars, so the court can determine exactly
what it would take to get one. In other cases, no replacement will
be available:' in cases of bodily injury, a prosthesis may not be
available, and even if one is, it will not fully make up the loss. The
difficulty of replacement makes the court's task much more difficult,
precisely because your body is so closely connected to your purpos-
iveness that your purposiveness is limited by bodily injury. If you
lose a toe, your ability to achieve the various purposes to which you
in fact aspire may remain largely unchanged. If so, you will have no
claim to consequential damages if you lose a toe through another
person's wrongdoing. You are still entitled to damages for the loss
of the toe, precisely because part of your ability to set your own
purposes includes the right to decide what to do with your toe, even
if through most of your life you decide to do nothing with it. Because
there is no market in toes, the precise quantum of damages will be
59. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
60. See Chapman, supra note 57, at 423.
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nominal, not in the sense that it is small, but rather because it
requires a decision by a competent court, one based on some
conception of the typical case.
61
The example of losing your toe is unrepresentative, because in
many cases of bodily injury plaintiff can make some claim about
what he would have been able to do had he not been injured. The
general point still holds, however. Your claim to have your means,
including your own person, subject to your own choice is not a
claim to the stream of income that those means would generate,
because your claim to have your purposiveness protected is not
simply a claim to have your ability to engage in market transactions
protected. You are the one who gets to decide what to do with your
own means, and earning income is only one of the things you might
decide to do.
F. Redescription
The general strategy for making it as though a wrong had never
happened is to make it as though something else had happened
instead. If I damage your property and pay for the cost of repairs
and any consequential losses, you have all of the means you would
have had if it-the wrong-had never happened. I have fewer
means, because it is as if I had damaged my own property. As a
result of my deed, I end up with less than I would have had. But the
change in my holdings that results from the initial transaction and
the one that corrects it is no more significant than the same change
would have been if it was the result of a single incident in which I
damaged my own property. Damages do not restore a prior distribu-
tion; once something has been damaged, that cannot be done,
because there is less after the injury than there was before. Instead,
they restore to the aggrieved party the things she had a right to.
She had no rights with respect to the size of the holdings of others,
61. Sometimes the loss is impossible to quantify. In defamation, plaintiff often recovers
"general damages," which make up the loss of a very important asset-his or her
reputation-the costs of which may be difficult to measure. See, e.g., Walsh v. Trenton Times,
Inc., 10 A.2d 740, 741 (N.J. 1940) (specifying some elements that help determine the
appropriate level of damages in libel and slander per se cases).
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just as nobody has a right that their holdings remain the same even
if they damage them. 2
G. A Further Illustration: Duplicative Causation
I want to illustrate these general points by focusing on a series of
familiar puzzles about duplicative causation in torts. The puzzles
arise in those cases in which defendant behaves negligently towards
plaintiff, or commits a nuisance interfering with a property right
plaintiff has, but some other factor, human or otherwise, produces
or would have produced the same injury. Ordinarily, the burden
lies with plaintiff to show that, were it not for defendant's action,
plaintiff would not have been injured. In these cases, plaintiff faces
a special difficulty because the duplicative cause seems to show that
she would have been injured anyway. A favorite example is Corey v.
Havener, in which two defendants drove their motorized tricycles on
the two sides of plaintiffs carriage.63 The noise startled plaintiffs
horse, as a result of which plaintiff was injured.' The two defen-
dants were not each allowed to avoid liability by pointing out that
the other one would have startled the horse and caused plaintiffs
injury. 65
The result seems obvious, but the source of the obviousness is not.
Some contend that the causation is significant for reasons of
administrative convenience, and where the ordinary standards of
proof fail, some other convenient way of providing injurers with
appropriate incentives or of guaranteeing compensation to injured
parties must take priority. I take this to be the general thrust of the
economic analysis, including Guido Calabresi's work.' Again, some
have offered broadly moralistic explanations, according to which
there is something wrong with the way in which each of the parties
is able to point to the other that requires that we change our basic
understanding of causation and its relevance in these cases.
A focus on administrative convenience or incentives simply
disregards the significance of the transaction between the parties,
62. Except by contract with an insurer.
63. 65 N.E. 69, 69 (Mass. 1902).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See CALABRESI, supra note 11, at 174-75.
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and singles out defendant to pay plaintiff purely as a matter of
administrative convenience. The moralistic explanation fares no
better, because it is also unable to preserve the relation between the
two parties: plaintiff recovers in the two-wrongdoer case because of
the relation between the wrongdoers, to which plaintiff seems to be
little more than a bystander--or what Cardozo might have called a
"vicarious beneficiary"67 of the distaste a court rightly has for
wrongdoers' claim of advantage from each other.
Two leading English causation cases point to a better explanation
of these issues. In the first of these, Baker v. Willoughby, plaintiff
was injured by defendant's negligent driving." He sued for the
income he would have lost because an injury to his leg prevented
him from working at his normal job.69 Before the case went to trial,
plaintiff was the victim of an unrelated attempted robbery, during
which he suffered further damage to the injured leg and lost it.70
Defendant sought to avoid liability for plaintiff's lost income after
the robbery, but the House of Lords rejected the argument.71 In the
second case, Jobling v. Associated Dairies Ltd., plaintiff suffered a
back injury that limited his ability to work.72 Before trial it was
discovered that he was suffering from an unrelated spinal disease
that made him unable to work.7' Defendant sought to avoid liability
for plaintiffs lost income on the grounds that he would have lost it
anyway. 74 The House of Lords accepted defendant's argument, and
insisted that it was consistent with the holding in Baker.75
67. Palsgrafv. Long Island R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928).
68. [1970] A.C. 467, 467 (H.L. 1969).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 467-68.
72. [1982] A.C. 794, 794 (H.L.).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 800.
75. Id. at 795. American courts largely parallel the approach outlined in Baker. See David
A. Fischer, Successive Causes and the Enigma of Duplicated Harm, 66 TENN. L. REV. 1127,
1129 n.7 (1999) (citing cases). The Third Restatement of Torts reads as follows:
After a person suffers harm, another causal set may exist that, had the initial
cause not existed, would have caused the same harm. Thus, this might occur
when one hunter negligently fires a rifle, killing a hiker, and, shortly thereafter,
another hunter negligently fires, and the second shot would have been sufficient
to cause the hiker's death, except that the death had already occurred. An act
or omission cannot be a factual cause of an outcome that has already occurred.
The first hunter's negligence is a cause of the hiker's death and preempts any
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This combination of results may seem puzzling, because in each
case it seems that, as a matter of natural fact, it can easily be said
that plaintiff would have suffered the loss anyway, and so defendant
did not cause it. The important difference, which seems to distin-
guish the two cases, is the fact that the second cause in Baker was
tortious. Yet it is not a problem of the two wrongdoers each being
able to point at each other; the result would have been the same if
the robber had dropped out of sight, and so there was nobody for the
other injurer to point to.
In Jobling, Lord Keith of Kinkel declined to formulate "a precise
juristic basis" for distinguishing supervening torts from supervening
illnesses, noting only that it might be said that a supervening tort
is not "one of the ordinary vicissitudes of life, or that it is too remote
a possibility to be taken into account, or that it can properly be
disregarded because it carries its own remedy. None of these
formulations, however, is entirely satisfactory.""
If rights survive wrongs, however, we have a simple and straight-
forward explanation of why the wrongdoer can point to a subsequent
natural event but cannot point to a subsequent tort. Plaintiff's
entitlement is to have his means free of wrongdoing by others. That
is the basic principle of damages under which plaintiff recovers
from defendant for his loss. Defendant can say that plaintiff would
have lost what he had to natural causes, because plaintiff has no
entitlements in relation to natural causes. Everything plaintiff has
is subject to natural deterioration, because all material objects are
subject to such deterioration. Thus defendant can appeal to the fact
that what plaintiff had would have been less valuable or less useful
in any variety of ways, due to natural wear and tear or surprising
natural accidents. Plaintiff's right against defendant is a right to
causal role in the hiker's death of the second hunter's negligence. A duplicative
factor, such as the second hunter's shot, need not arise after harm has occurred.
Thus, if the hiker had terminal cancer at the time the first hunter's bullet killed
the hiker, the hunter's negligence is a factual cause of the hiker's death, while
the cancer is not. However, the hiker's cancer may be relevant to the measure
of damages for which the hunter is liable, as courts may, when equitable and
appropriate, adjust the damages recoverable to reflect that defendant has
deprived plaintiff of less than a full measure of damages for the harm.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABIUTY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 26 cmt. k (Proposed Final
Draft 2005); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 924 cmt. e (1979) (discussing how to
determine the length of life "[i]n the case of permanent injuries or injuries causing death").
76. Jobling, [1982] A.C. at 815.
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have the means he would have, that is, subject to natural deteriora-
tion. If plaintiffs parked car is destroyed by a meteorite moments
after defendant negligently damages it, defendant can truly say not
just that plaintiff would have had only the remains of the car, but,
further, that plaintiff would only have had a right to the remains of
his car and not to an intact car. Defendant wronged plaintiff, but
deprived her of nothing. On the other hand, if plaintiffs car is
vandalized after defendant wrongfully damages it, and the vandal-
ism is unconnected to the accident, defendant cannot appeal to it.
Plaintiffs entitlement to her car is an entitlement to a car against
which no wrongs have been committed.
Although the first tortfeasor cannot reduce liability by pointing
to subsequent tortfeasors, a second tortfeasor can reduce liability by
pointing to earlier ones. The second tortfeasor can truly say that
plaintiff had already lost some of her means. The asymmetry follows
from the fact that the principle that rights survive wrongs applies
as between any plaintiff-defendant pair, rather than somehow
surviving in the abstract, apart from a particular transaction
between the parties. If plaintiff is already injured, second defendant
deprives plaintiff only of what plaintiff still had, because the sense
in which plaintiffs right against first defendant survived was just
in the sense of plaintiffs entitlement to damages from first defen-
dant. Second defendant has not interfered with that entitlement, so
plaintiff only has a claim against second defendant for those means
with which second defendant interfered.
In the case of simultaneous torts, including Corey itself, each
defendant is liable because the only respect in which either one can
point to the other is as a subsequent wrongdoer. Defendant cannot
say that plaintiff's horse already was startled, but only that it would
have been startled anyway-that is, that plaintiff would have been
wronged anyway. That is exactly the claim that plaintiffs right does
not survive wrongdoing.
I now want to bring this point to bear on a more general issue
about money damages: a tort deprives plaintiff of means to which
she is entitled. Money damages make up the value of those means.
That value can only be calculated against the background of the
assumption of properly functioning markets, that is, against the
background of the assumption that nobody wrongs anybody else.
Things only have prices on the assumption that people will enter
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AS IF IT HAD NEVER HAPPENED
into honest contractual relations with each other. If they do not, the
magnitude of the loss is indeterminate."
V. AN INTENTIONAL TORTS ILLUSTRATION: GAIN-BASED DAMAGES
.John Goldberg has recently bemoaned the fact that the law of
torts is "unloved" in contemporary legal scholarship.7 8 If the law of
torts is unloved, then intentional torts in particular are the
neglected child of that scholarship. I do not have the space here to
fully repair that neglect, or even to take them into protective
custody. Nonetheless, I want to reintroduce them to show the
significance they have to the claim that the law of damages makes
it as though wrongs had never happened.
Intentional torts often involve intentional wrongdoing, but they
are puzzling from many perspectives because they seemingly are
also torts of strict liability that involve no apparent wrongdoing.
Goldberg describes the tort of trespass as normatively complex,
because it can be done innocently yet intentionally. 9 Trespass
against land is an intentional tort, but so is battery; doctrinally, a
common trespass against minerals is a central case, as is conver-
sion.
I want to suggest, however, that intentional torts are normatively
simple, for the very reasons that Goldberg finds them complex. An
intentional tort involves using means that belong to another person
for purposes that person has not authorized. The intention is
required because, based on the Aristotelian conception of action
introduced earlier, someone must intentionally use means that
properly belong to another. You cannot use means except intention-
ally, because, on this analysis, to act intentionally is simply to take
up means in order to pursue an end. The element of intention
requires using means in order to pursue your ends.
77. The same point applies to other types of wrongs to which defendant might seek to
appeal. If women are unjustly paid less than men for the same work, a defendant should not
be allowed to reduce liability by pointing out that plaintiff would have suffered from wage
discrimination, because the right to use her powers to earn income is a right to use it in the
absence of wrongs by others.
78. See John C.P. Goldberg, Unloved: Tort in the Modern Legal Academy, 55 VAND. L. REV.
1501, 1502-03 (2002).
79. See John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the
Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 597-98 (2005).
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Far from being in tension with this understanding of intention,
the combination of strict liability and intention is an immediate
consequence of it: If I use something for my purposes, I may not
know who properly gets to decide how it will be used. I can use a
piece of land for setting up my tent, without knowing whose land it
is. For that matter, I may not even be reflectively aware that I am
using it-perhaps I am so tired, or setting up my tent is so routine,
that I do it without thinking about it at all. I still act intentionally,
because I act on the rule "use land to set up your tent." But I may
not realize I am doing so on your land, because the minor premise,
as Aristotle would call it, of my action is "here is some land." Like
Aristotle's example of the man who says "[d]ry food is good for every
man" and "[this sort of] food is dry,"' and proceeds to eat it, I
identified my means without reference to their title. The description
under which I take them focuses on their usefulness for my
particular purpose, rather than their situation from the standpoint
of rights. Nothing is objectionable about my thinking in this way.
The wrong of trespass is not my indifference to the rights of others,
but rather my use of some thing for a purpose its owner has not
authorized.8' Lack of due care on my part is not part of the wrong.
Duties of noninjury are qualified to reconcile our respective
interests in liberty and security. I have a liberty interest in using
my means in ways that pose a small risk to you, even if they
sometimes cause injury. I have no parallel interest in being able to
use your means, so my duty to avoid doing so is unqualified, that is,
strict8 2
80. See ARISTOTLE, ETHICA NICHOMACHEA Book VII, ch. 3 (350 B.C.E.), reprinted in 9
WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1147 (W.D. Ross trans., 1925).
81. The sense of intention at issue in intentional torts is thus significantly different from
the role of intention in the criminal law. In both cases, an intention is best analyzed in terms
of the use of the means to achieve a particular purpose: "I will use this land to graze my cattle
on." An intentional tort violates the landowner's private right by using it for a purpose that
he has not authorized, but I can use it without realizing that the land belongs to somebody
else. Thus an intentional tort can be committed innocently. In the criminal law, the intention
is also analyzed in terms of the means that a criminal uses in order to achieve his purpose,
but in the most familiar cases of crimes mala in se, the criminal uses means that are
inconsistent with the very existence of a legal system, such as property belonging to another.
Thus the intention is to be analyzed as "I will use what belongs to another for achieving my
own purposes." I examine these issues in more detail in my forthcoming book on Kant's
Doctrine of Right.
82. I discuss this issue in more detail in Arthur Ripstein, Tort Law in a Liberal State, 1
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The remedy reflects this wrong: plaintiffs property is to be used
only for her purposes. If it is used for a purpose she has not autho-
rized, the law must make it as if the wrong had never happened. It
cannot undo the fact of defendant's use of the property, but the law
can treat it as if it were plaintiffs own use by requiring defendant
to disgorge his gains.s3 At the highest level of abstraction, it is as if
the wrong had never happened: plaintiffs property is used to create
additional means for plaintiff. Those new means are then subject to
plaintiffs choice.'
J. ToRT L. (forthcoming 2007).
83. In Jacque u. Steenberg Homes, Inc., the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld a jury
verdict of $1 in nominal damages for a trespass, and reinstated an award of $100,000 in
punitive damages against defendant company. 563 N.W.2d 154, 166 (Wis. 1997). Plaintiffs
refused to grant defendant permission to cut across their land to deliver a mobile home to a
neighboring lot, even after defendant offered to pay. Id. at 157. Defendant proceeded to cut
across anyway, so as to save itself considerable expense in using a steep snow-covered road.
Id. On the analysis offered here, the punitive damages can be understood as legitimate insofar
as they approximate defendant's gain from the unauthorized trespass. For detailed discussion
of Jacque, see Thomas W. Merrill and Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 1849, 1871-74 (2007).
84. If the wrong is intentional in a more robust sense, and defendant willfully wrongs
plaintiff, for example, by using plaintiffs property for his own purposes, he is made to
disgorge any gains he might make and, in some cases, is not allowed any offset for expenses
that he might have incurred in making those gains. And so, it would appear, plaintiff receives
a windfall. Even if we can understand why defendant should not be allowed to keep his profit,
it is not obvious, in terms of making things as they would have been had the wrong never
occurred, why plaintiff should be entitled to a positive gain. So in one case defendant is worse
off than he would have been, and in the other plaintiff apparently is better off than she would
have been. In what sense have things returned to normal?
In other cases, however, the way in which I wrong you is not by damaging your
property-that is, I do not interfere with your use of your person or property, but only with
your possession of it. Here too, the remedy can be understood as justified in terms of a
redescription of the situation. If I use what is yours, without your consent, I wrong you. The
problem is coming up with the way in which that wrong can be righted, and the only way it
can be righted is turning it into a situation in which nobody does wrong after all. The proper
way to do so, when I use your property without your consent but without recognizing that it
is your property, is to bring about the results that would have occurred had I been acting on
your behalf. And so I must surrender any profits I have, because, having acted on your behalf,
you are entitled to the profits that accrue from my action. The leading cases of this sort
involve accidental trespass against minerals. For example, I discover coal that is under your
land and has been disoriented by the tunnels that I dug beginning under my own land. Of
course, getting the coal out from under your land requires effort on my part, and if I am
innocently but mistakenly acting on your behalf, I must be understood as having acted as your
agent. As would be the case with any agent acting on your behalf in this way, I am entitled
to deduct reasonable expenses that I incur, as I acted for your benefit. So I must give you the
profits from the coal, but I need not give you the full price of the coal, because I can deduct the
cost of removing it and taking it to market. Again, the crucial point here is that my act is
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redescribed in a way so that it is not wrongful.
By contrast, if I willfully take what is yours without your consent, and mean to appropriate
it for purposes of my own, a different analysis must be made to apply. If I wrong you
intentionally, I cannot simply be taken to be acting on your behalf. If I were so taken, then
I could, through my wrong, force you to hire me as your agent-that is, I could decide
unilaterally that you will use my services to get your coal out of the ground. But I cannot do
that unilaterally: allowing me to do so would be incompatible with equal limits on freedom,
because I would be able to enlist you into a purpose that you did not share. Of course, I may
accidentally so enlist you, as when I accidentally use what is yours, but if I do, it can be
turned into your purpose. By contrast, to force you to use my services for removing your coal
is something that cannot be turned into your purpose.
In this example, we need a different redescription of the situation, which allows us to say
that you are entitled to the benefits of your property, but also that I am not able to claim the
fruits of my efforts. This may seem puzzling, because seemingly a regime of equal freedom
always entitles me to claim the fruits of my efforts. But that conclusion rests on a
misunderstanding, one that goes to the heart of the focus on benefits and burdens. As a
general matter, I am not, as a matter of right, entitled to the fruits of my efforts. I am only
entitled to the fruits of my efforts if I manage to retain them. I might retain the fruits of my
efforts by putting my efforts into things that have no side effects on others. This turns out to
be remarkably difficult to do; I can harvest most of the fruits of my efforts if, for example, I
work on my own land, but some fruits of my efforts may spill off of my land and benefit others.
I am entitled only to those fruits of my efforts provided that I negotiate with others to keep
them. So, if I know that you are benefitting from the shade cast by my fence, I can tell you
that I will tear down my fence if you do not pay me a certain fee. But I cannot claim that you
have been unjustly enriched by the past existence of my fence and demand a share of your
profits. I cannot do that because I do not have a right to exclude others from side benefits of
my activity, except, in the sense that I can change my activity unless they agree to pay me.
Again, if, for example, I leave a basket of flowers on your doorstep, and, as a result, a
potential purchaser of your house comes away with a particularly good impression and buys
the house for a higher fee than you might otherwise have been able to fetch, I cannot claim
a share in your profits. I can only reclaim my basket of flowers. To vary the example in a way
that will perhaps make it more obvious, if we are neighbors and I keep a beautiful garden, the
result of which your house looks better to prospective purchasers, I cannot claim a share of
your profits, because you did not ask me to go into business with you, and you did not in any
way acquiesce in the benefit. You did not really have much choice in the matter; you just kept
your house where it was. As Baron Pollock put it in a nineteenth-century English case, "one
cleans another's shoes; what can the other do but put them on?" Taylor v. Laird, (1856) 25 L.J.
Ex. 329, 332. Even if you set out to confer a benefit on me, you cannot then claim the benefit
unless I have freely accepted it, precisely because you cannot unilaterally force me into a
contractual arrangement with you. If I cannot force you into a contractual arrangement by
conferring a benefit on you, and so cannot force you to use my services in such a case, I
certainly cannot force you to use my services in the case in which I set out to take your
property as my own. Instead, I must be understood as having done something from which you
benefit, but for which I have no right to demand payment.
Returning to our example, then, although I am acting on your behalf in bringing your coal
to market, I am not allowed to force you, through my unilateral choice, to pay me for my
efforts. Instead, what had appeared to be your windfall turns out to be no different from the
windfall you receive if I shine your shoes in the hope that you will pay me, or the windfall you
receive if I beautify my garden in a way that increases the value of your home. In each case,
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Not every trespass produces a gain for defendant. Some produce
a loss for plaintiff, in which case plaintiff is entitled to be put back
where she would have been if the trespass had never happened.
That is the result if my cattle wander onto your land and flatten
your crops. Coase's famous claim that the harms are the reciprocal
effects of ongoing activities85 is true but beside the point: your claim
to damages in trespass is not based on the harm I cause you, but on
my using your land for a purpose you have not authorized. The
relationship of trespass is not reciprocal: I have used your land, but
you have not used mine. Because I have wronged you, you are
entitled to be put back in the situation you would have been in if the
wrong had never happened. The harm you suffered only appears as
the magnitude of the means my trespass deprived you of.86
CONCLUSION
I want to close with some broader observations about the broader
theme of this Symposium, that is, the relation between law and
morality. Explanatory and interpretive tort theory developed in the
wake of the collapse of legal realism in American law schools in the
middle part of the twentieth century. Unfortunately, the collapse of
legal realism did not completely change the broader conception of
what it is to be properly tough-minded and focused on the facts. One
aspect of this residual tough-mindedness was a readiness to assume,
I could offer to do these things for you in return for a fee, and if you accept my offer you would
thereby be bound to pay for the benefits received. But because I did not offer to do these
things for you, I cannot force you to pay for the benefit. I must be understood instead as
having squandered my efforts, and you, as it turned out, received a benefit. The benefit is a
windfall, in the sense that you, having been wronged by me, end up with more than you would
have received had we negotiated an agreement. But there are many ways in which you can
benefit from my activities to a greater degree then you would have had we negotiated an
agreement with respect to those activities. But that is simply my loss, and your gain.
The criminal law will have a different description of the same facts, for it will label me a
thief. But its interest in punishing me for theft is not an interest in setting things right
between the two of us.
85. Coase, supra note 31, at 2.
86. Some trespasses produce neither gains nor losses. In such cases, plaintiff is entitled
to "nominal" damages, that is, damages that articulate the nature of the wrong without
quantifying it. Such damages are nominal by name, but not by nature, because they are based
on the existence of a wrong.
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almost by default from the lack of a suitably tough-minded alterna-
tive, that the law of torts must be concerned with reducing harm.
Harm and loss are real events in the world in a way that rights and
duties might be thought not to be. Holmes's statement is character-
istic: "[T]he general purpose of the law of torts is to secure a man
indemnity against certain forms of harm to person, reputation, or
estate, at the hands of his neighbors, not because they are wrong,
but because they are harms."87 Familiar types of harm can be
identified without reference to how they come about,' so when
harm is in view it is a short step to the conclusion that the familiar
landscape of legal doctrine is comprised of a series of tools designed
to prevent or reduce unwelcome outcomes. From these premises, it
is almost inevitable that law would be understood as an instrument,
to be understood and evaluated in terms of its actual reduction of
the target outcomes.
Instrumental analysis of tort law has lost some of its luster, as
critics have pointed to its inability to make sense of core doctrinal
ideas such as duty,89 or the relational nature of liability in tort.9"
Half a century ago, ideas now prominent in torts scholarship might
have been charged with failure to mean anything, and so made
"hard ... to read the books of, people who do not seem to be worried
about the problem of convincing the sceptic that their ... proposi-
tions mean something."91 But the broader assumption that tort law
must have some sort of function, that it must be called to account for
its success or failure at delivering some set of goods that can be
specified outside of it-be they harm prevention, wealth maximiza-
tion, or civil peace and the sublation of the desire for revenge-
keeps reasserting itself.
Instrumentalism no longer seems inevitable when the focus is
shifted from harms to wrongs. The ordinary and familiar ways of
thinking and talking about wrongs and remedies do make sense.
Damages make it as if a wrong had never happened. The example
of damages also reveals a broader point with respect to the sup-
posed lessons of supposedly sophisticated talk about the "purposes"
87. HOLMES, supra note 7, at 145.
88. FEINBERG, supra note 14, at 31.
89. See WEINRIB, supra note 19, at 170; Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 18, at 707-08.
90. See WEINRIB, supra note 19, at 10-11.
91. See HARE, METHOD, supra note 1, at 49.
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of law, and their related urge to unmask or otherwise discipline
legal language: we can carry on in our old ways as if nothing had
happened.
